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Benemar Benatta, detained shortly after the September 11 attacks, after his 2006 release. The former Algerian air force lieutenant was locked up the longest of the

post-September 11 detainees. nathan denette/ap photo/cp

The Bush administration promised not to "single out" Arabs and Muslims wi

measures, but in practice it did exactly that. These measures signaled to

and non-citizens alike, that American legal protections did not really apply
little in the way of fighting terrorism.
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The idea that Arab and Muslim terrorists were hiding in

available statute. We will seek every prosecutorial advantage. We

America under a veneer of normalcy, just waiting to attack,
struck fear into the hearts of Americans. Bush administration

will use all our weapons within the law and under the Constitution

statements were clear, calling fear to action: "The federal
government cannot fight this reign of terror alone. Every
American must help us defend our nation against this enemy/'

Americans quickly came to view Arab and Muslims in the
US?citizens, permanent residents and visitors alike?with

to protect life and enhance security for America.... Some will ask

whether a civilized nation?a nation of law and not of men?can
use the law to defend itself from barbarians and remain civilized. Our
answer, unequivocally, is "yes." Yes, we will defend civilization.

?Attorney General John Ashcroft

suspicion. Since terrorists were alleged to be Arabs and Substituting "Arab and Muslim male non-citizens" where the
Muslims posing as normal persons residing inconspicuously word "terrorists" appears in Ashcroft's speech of October 25,
in "our communities," close observation of them was not only

2001 provides a proximate rendering of other anti-terrorism

necessary but also possessed of an air of patriotism. Arabs and

policies in the wake of the September 11 attacks, and certainly

Muslims spoke of a persistent feeling of being watched, of

the way Arab and Muslim men perceived them. Invoking
the language of the "clash of civilizations," this statement

feeling that such actions as opening a car trunk, checking the

mail or making an overseas phone call were subject to wild equates terrorists and barbarians with visa violators and local
reinterpretation. In turn, Arabs and Muslims expended extra lawbreakers, Arab and Muslim male non-citizens providing the
effort to convince spectators of their innocence and innocuous unmentioned link between the categories. A close reading of
ness. Whether or not each Arab and Muslim living in the US Ashcroft's language in the passage below locates the discursive
was in fact watched, most of them understood that, in the new trick in its fuzzy definition of "the law," positioning of the word
panoptical world, they were under somebody's surveillance,

"or" and linkage of this blurred language to terrorists:

and conducted their daily lives accordingly.
As a result of the heightened focus on Arabs and Muslims,

In the war on terror, this Department of Justice will arrest and detain

Ashcroft could declare on September 18, 2001, one week after
the attacks: "To date the FBI has received more than 96,000

any suspected terrorist who has violated the law. Our single objective is

tips and potential leads: more than 54,000 on the website,

If suspects are found not to have links to terrorism or not to have

nearly 9,000 on the hot line, the toll-free WATTS line, and
more than 33,000 leads that were generated in the FBI field
offices." Each lead required an FBI or law enforcement visit to
a worksite or home. WTiile it is now clear that these interviews

to prevent terrorist attacks by taking suspected terrorists off the street.

violated the law, they are released. But terrorists who are in violation

of the law will be convicted, in some cases deported, and in all cases
prevented from doing further harm to Americans.

produced little useful information, at the time they suggested

In the next paragraph, Ashcroft is able to use this vague

to onlookers that the subject bore some measure of guilt, even

language to claim nearly 1,000 terrorist arrests, proving that

if by association. They fed into the notion that Arabs and the government was keeping Americans safe.
Muslims were people who, if not terrorists themselves, could

be harboring terrorists or covering up their knowledge of
brewing terrorist plots. The interviews stigmatized Arabs and
Muslims because bystanders likely presumed that something

serious, something more than a name, a skin color, a phone
call or a manner of dress, had spurred the visit.

The suspicions were unwarranted. As former FBI counter
terrorism agent Michael Rolince told the 2005 Muslim Public

Within days of the September 11 attacks, we launched this anti
terrorism offensive to prevent new attacks on our homeland. To date,

our anti-terrorism offensive has arrested or detained nearly 1,000
individuals as part of the September 11 terrorism investigation. Those

who violated the law remain in custody. Taking suspected terrorists
in violation of the law off the streets and keeping them locked up is
our clear strategy to prevent terrorism within our borders.

Affairs Council convention, after "about half a million FBI
interviews...I'm not aware, and I know 9/11 about as well as

In fact, these detainees were overwhelmingly Arab and Muslim
anybody in the FBI knows 9/11.. .of any single person in your men who were arrested on the basis of looks, national origins
community who had they stepped forward could have provided or reports of suspicion, as well as not being able to prove at the
a clue to help us get out in front of this. The reality of that attackmoment of contact with police that their presence in the US

is that 19 people came here with what they needed."2 Arabs and was legal. Human Rights Watch's conclusion that "being a male
Muslims in the US would endure much more than interviews Muslim non-citizen from certain countries became a proxy for
before the pressure on their communities would be lessened.
suspicious behavior" highlights the primary use of stereotypes

Visa Violators Are Terrorists

and phenotypes in government actions. Ditto the public, as

the human rights organization found that some men were
incarcerated "simply because spouses, neighbors or members of

Let the terrorists among us be warned: If you overstay your visa?even

the public said they were 'suspicious' or accused them without

by one day?we will arrest you. If you violate a local law, you will be

any credible basis of being terrorists."3 Some men were arrested

put in jail and kept in custody as long as possible. We will use every

because they were seen in rental cars, taking photos at tourist
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Safa al-Habash and tier son Basil, 10, sip a Father's Day card to protest the plight of fathers who had been deported or were facing deportation due to post-September 11

immigration measures. mario tama/getty images
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ethnic profiling since World War II,"
uncovered few terrorists.5 Not a single
one of the 80,000 Arabs and Muslims
who were required to register with the
government because they were in the US

I Deportations Before and After September 11
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on temporary visas was convicted of a
terrorist charge. The same holds true for

some 5,000 preventive detentions and

tens of thousands of FBI interviews. The

Bush administration said it had located
terrorist cells in Detroit, Portland, Seattle,

northern Virginia and Lackawanna, New
York, but a close look at these cases shows
that none of these groups were proven to

I H IH

c= 2000- - - - -H-^m

Bl wM IH 10 ^B ^1

+?> b^^I ^^H ^^H ^^H ^^H ^^H

ro H?' j^M
^H
^M
^M
^^H ^^H
^^H
^^H^M
^^H ^^M

j ?. 1500-1-B-rB-rB-rBr-B
H H H H H H
Q

^
? ^B
? ?^B--^B-;-: j-|:
a?1000?^?
^B ^B 1^1
^B ^B
^B BH
^B
?2 ^M ^M ^m ^M ^M ^M ^B ^M ^m ^M
^

I Hi ^B l^M ^B ^B ^B BB ^B ^B ^B

have plans to inflict damage on the US.
Only one of these groups, the Lackawanna

Six, had an al-Qaeda connection. This
group of young Yemeni-American men
was not a new discovery at all; they had

o1998
I 1999
[ +^-|~^^-^^l
111 ^^-^^
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Year

been reported to the FBI months before

the September 11 attacks by an Arab
Muslim neighbor, who had learned of their

plans to join an al-Qaeda training camp in
Afghanistan. Shortly after arriving at the
camp in the spring of 2001, some of the

Deportation ("removal") orders issued for people from countries covered by the Justice
Department's "special registration" program launched on September 11,2002. Increases
were evident for many countries, not only Arab or Muslim countries. Chart does not include
data for Bahrain, Libya, Oman and Qatar. Source: Department of Homeland Security, Office
of Immigration Statistics.

boys fled in fear, wanting nothing to do with what was going onHoly Land Foundation for Relief and Development eventually
there, while others finished training and later returned home.6

being charged with financing terrorism. Irrespective of these

Resuming their lives in Lackawanna under FBI observation differences, the assets of all were frozen. Under an executive
and wiretapping, they did nothing materially suspicious and

order, the government was not required to produce evidence

evinced no sign that they ever had plans to stage an attack. Yet

supporting these closures. As a result of these actions, needy

when they were arrested in September 2002, they were heralded recipients in the Muslim world were largely cut off from the

as the Bush administration's key homegrown terrorist find.

charity of American Muslims. Repeated requests to the US

The government's success with criminal indictments in government to allow the transfer of these charities' assets to
"terrorism-related" cases fared only somewhat better. As of

agencies of which it approved were denied. In October 2007 a
2005, more than 400 post-September 11 "terrorism-related" jury acquitted the Holy Land Foundation and its directors of all
indictments had produced some 200 convictions.7 In fact, of the 197 criminal violations related to funding terrorism. In
only 39 of these "terrorism-related" cases resulted in convic
the meantime, however, fears concerning financial transactions,
tions on terrorism charges, and the majority of these were for whether sending remittances to family members back home or

"support" of a terrorist group (encompassing a wide range of
non-criminal activities). An analysis conducted in 2003 by the

charitable giving, were high among Arabs and Muslims. Under

Justice Department identified as "terrorism-related" was 14

needed to support the mobilizations required to defend Arab

days, hardly evidence of a terrorist catch. In 2005, New York

and Muslim civil rights.

the Patriot Act, charitable giving could now be prosecuted
Syracuse-based Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse as support for terrorism. Charities remaining open received
found that the median sentence handed down in cases the substantially fewer donations at precisely the time they were

University's Center on Law and Security reviewed the "terror

The government's actions and unsubstantiated claims, and

related" cases and found "almost no convictions on charges

the sensationalist media coverage that accompanied each, had

reflecting dangerous crimes." Some have argued that the

other punitive outcomes. They stoked public fear and granted

government's anti-terrorism measures had deterrent value, but

the government the leeway it needed to sidestep the rule of

as with the death penalty, any such value cannot, by definition,

be measured.

law. The production of 96,000 tips within seven days of the
attacks highlights the fact that the public response to Arabs and

The Treasury Department closed six Muslim charities and

made it a crime to engage in transactions with them. No

Muslims was based on preexisting stereotypes. Government
statements of threat and pleas for help needed no backup

charges were filed against three of the six, and criminal charges

documentation, as they leveraged social understandings about

were brought and then dropped against two, with only the

Arabs and Muslims that were already widely held. These
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narratives and stereotypes allowed the government excesses

The Road Ahead

after September n to occur because they provided a context in

It was precisely such excesses by the Bush administration in
addition to violent public backlash against Arab and Muslim
who were not part of the American nation. Since "they" threat Americans that set in motion the dialectic of social change.

which the government needed to prove little, and paved the way
for the symbolic reconstitution of Arabs and Muslims as people

ened "our" communities, it was easy to render them ineligible
for the full package of American civil and constitutional rights.

Poll after poll, along with flag waving in front of mosques and

in Arab-American neighborhoods, showed substantial public

Arab and Muslim Americans recognized the challenge
before them rather quickly after the September n attacks
and vigorously stepped up to defend their rights. And they

were not alone.

support for depriving Arabs and Muslims of civil liberties. In
The coalitions that emerged to defend Arab and Muslim
fact, Arabs and Muslims were often described as persons who Americans effectively transformed their status in many US loca
moved to the US just to take advantage of these very rights in
order to carry out their plots of destruction.

Despite the dragnet tactics, a cooperative citizenry, secret

tions from "outsider" or "unknown" communities to engaged and

known ones. Over time, Arab and Muslim Americans became

more deeply woven into the fabric of an extensive range of

evidence and secret hearings, the government s allegation that American activist, policy and watchdog organizations and many

Arab and Muslim terrorists were lurking in Arab and Muslim

of their own community and faith-based organizations became

American communities, "plotting, planning and waiting to stronger. Philanthropists and foundations formerly reluctant to
kill Americans," was never proven correct. Nonetheless, these
measures delivered a frightening world for Arabs and Muslims
living in the US. In fact, it was the near ioo percent rate of false

positives that exacerbated their anxiety because it produced

support Arab and Muslim American organizations came forward

with financial support after September n because emergency
circumstances outweighed normative pressures to hold back.

This material support, in turn, bolstered Arab and Muslim

an understanding that, for them, anything goes. One did American institution building and leadership development. All
not need to be guilty of any wrongdoing to be turned in by a

of these positive social changes make it now far more politically

neighbor, visited by the FBI, pulled off an airplane, denied a

difficult than in the first few years after the September n attacks

bank account, detained, arrested, incarcerated or charged.

for the US government to implement policies that openly and
visibly target Arab and Muslim Americans en masse.

The post-September n experience for Arab and Muslim

^2JflJEjStantord
University Press
Surrounded
Palestinian Soldiers in the Israeli Military
RHODA ANN KANAANEH

Americans thus reveals a paradoxical historical moment. At the
same time that members of these groups experienced extensive

institutional discrimination, government targeting (mainly
focused on men) and public attacks (largely focused on women

H^Mk * 4HK "This book provides a unique focus on the conflicted

IBHi s"^ aGE situati?n ?f Palestinian citizens inside Israel through
HB^jSHB examining those among them who choose to serve in
H^BSII^KK tne armY ?f the Jewish state. A fascinating, engrossing
K^^^Sp^W and thought-provoking book."
R r5iC^'? VV'-'* Columbia University, author of The Iron Cage:

Mmm jJktoM*m The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood

B|^^^^m| Stanford and
Studies
in Middle Eastern and Islamic Societies
Cultures
$24.95 cloth

and Islamic religious institutions), they also experienced
enhanced civic inclusion. This civic inclusion is by no means
evenly distributed across the nation, nor is it uncontested, but

it is measurable nonetheless. This perhaps unexpected positive

outcome emerged from the dialectic put into motion when
state repression, public attacks and popular vilification became
intolerable to many. The work of countless groups left a hand

print on the post-September n Arab and Muslim American
story: human rights organizations investigating abuses of
prisoners; philanthropies supporting community defense work;

The Invisible Cage

civil rights attorneys defending the falsely accused; immigrant

Syrian Migrant Workers in Lebanon
JOHN CHALCRAFT

coalitions marching in protest against government excesses;

This new volume uncovers the hidden history of Syrian migrant workers in
Lebanon, from independence to the present, to break new ground in Middle

Japanese American and other ethnic organizations calling for
an end to profiling; community organizers conducting civil

East Studies and challenge existing ways of thinking about migration.

rights teach-ins and special registration monitoring; mosques

"This book is strong and to the point, and it covers material no other

organizing open houses; neighborhood organizations forming

work does."

?Ussama Makdisi,
Rice University

Stanford Studies in Middle Eastern and Islamic Societies and Cultures

$24.95 paper $65.00 cloth (^^ Oflf f\Vf%

l^S^^fifi'^ University Press

^Sli|l;ffi:--;;. 8?Mat,2736 www.sup.org

mosque defense committees; inter-faith groups speaking out
against hate crimes; schoolgirls exchanging solidarity visits; and

local and national Arab and Muslim American organizations
taking on a broader range of tasks than ever before.
Still, nativist voices keep alive a countervailing social impulse
that Arab and Muslim Americans need to remain as "outsiders"

in American society because they are persons "who cannot be
16 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 249 WINTER 2008
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trusted to live by the rules." These are not isolated individuals,
but include elected officials, candidates for office and media

personalities. Charges of Muslim American disloyalty were
part of a number of 2008 political campaigns, in some cases
sparking the criminalization and return of Muslim American
campaign donations.8 A 2007 presidential primary advertise
ment for Republican Rudy Giuliani referred to Muslims as "a
people perverted." The most substantial resurgence of nativism,

however, occurred during the 2008 general election campaign,
when anti-Arab and anti-Muslim sentiments were mobilized to
sow fear of (now) President-elect Barack Obama, who, although

not Muslim, is the biological son of a Muslim man. Long-time

Rep. Ray LaHood (R-IL) told WGN radio on October 10, 2008
that, while he supported the Republican presidential ticket, he

<iv?^ %^ JL^jr B. %r*- JL .1.,* ^w- it. m.

Diaspora

A Photographic History of

the Palestinians 1876-1948
Walid Khalidi

was profoundly dismayed by crowds shouting "Kill him!" and
"Terrorist!" when Obama's name was mentioned during rallies
for GOP vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin.
Although they continue to face structural barriers of race
and religious difference, Arab and Muslim Americans enter

8^^_^-^-^^_^-^-^^_-^-^--^-^-^

the future in a better socio-political position than that they
occupied on September 11, 2001. At a minimum, their height

ened social and civic engagement should provide them with
better protection from attack and mass arrest should another
event occur that some might use to assign collective responsi
bility. Theoretically, the relationships are in place to block the

major assaults on their civil rights and safety that occurred
during the Bush years. It is unfortunately the case, however,
that these very changes in Arab and Muslim American social
status have exposed the segments of American society that rely

on anti-Arab and anti-Muslim sentiments to promote their

?: _*__#_______
a&BGiJ$&
?"?M.M:
. _flv'__^_n

own interests. While these groups existed before September
11, it was then that they were able to capitalize on the public's

lack of knowledge and on Arab and Muslim social exclusion
to get their message across. Well-organized, well-financed and
invested in inciting fear, they continue to rely on strife in the

Middle East to make their claims. As long as arguments that
Arabs and Muslims are fundamentally different from "us" are
socially tolerated in the United States, whether referring to
people at home or abroad, it is difficult to pronounce that the
road ahead will be smooth for Arab and Muslim Americans.
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